The Source of Adventism’s Physical God

JORDAN QUINLEY

 

Adventism’s theology was built around James White’s denial of “spirit” and his belief that God—and thus man also—was physical and not spirit. Ellen White adopted the view that God has a body and man has no spirit except “breath”. Jordan Quinley shows biblically why God cannot be physical. 

 

Of all the surprising things that I have learned about Seventh-day Adventist teaching, the one that bowled me over more than any other was the teaching that God has a body of flesh and bone. The idea is astonishing to me. An article about it published on the Life Assurance Ministries blog cited the earliest Adventist defense of this idea—a pamphlet by Ellen G. White’s husband, James White, on the “Personality of God.” James White’s paper exhibits important misunderstandings, and so I would like to address his main arguments from an evangelical perspective. He discusses four broad points and ends by criticizing the concept of an immaterial (nonphysical) God as being nearly indistinguishable from atheism. 

White begins by talking about man as the image of God, as described in Genesis 1:26, stating that this likeness refers to physical form. Next, White points to anthropomorphic language (that is, language describing God in partial or full human form) used in the Bible. This he takes literally. Third, he argues that since Jesus, who was a man, is the express image and exact representation of God, God also has a body like a man’s. Fourth, White argues that the classical doctrine of omnipresence destroys the idea of heaven as a place of God’s unique dwelling.

Let me begin by addressing the title of James White’s article, “Personality of God”. White does not define “personality” as Christians historically have. For him, personality means bodily existence. We see this when he offers “proof that God is a person,” and speaks of those who “deny the personality of God,” meaning those who deny the physicality of God. But we do not deny that God is a person. His personhood is tied to his ability to think, to will, and to act. So while for White, “immaterial person” would be a contradiction in terms, for us it is not. Recognizing that misunderstanding, one can see why White might find the classical Christian view nonsensical.

White starts with the claim that man was made in the image of God. This is true, but he goes on to say that “those who deny the personality of God, say that ‘image’ here does not mean physical form, but moral image.”1 He notes how this definition is used to prove the immortality of the human soul. “But this mode of reasoning,” says White, “would also prove man omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipresent, and thus clothe mortal man with all the attributes of the deity.”

He insists that our being made in God’s image must mean that our physical form is a copy of God’s physical form. It must mean this, he believes, because if the shared image meant anything other than this, such as a “moral image,” it would prove too much. From an Adventist perspective it would prove that God also bestowed his omni-attributes on us. 

White, then, could not have been well informed regarding the doctrine of the image of God in mankind, known as the imago dei, as classically expressed in Christian thought. Christianity has long distinguished between the attributes of God we can share in lesser measure (communicable attributes), and those we cannot (incommunicable attributes), and has never taught that the imago dei endowed human beings with “all the attributes of the deity.” There was never any concern that if the image of God referred to metaphysical realities, it would logically follow that God had bestowed all his own attributes on his creatures.

Writing in 1861, White would have had access at least to the writings of John Calvin if he wanted a clearer picture of the Christian view on the image of God. In chapter 15 of his Institutes of Christian Religion, speaking about the imago dei, Calvin says:

In Colossians 3:10, [the Apostle Paul] states that the new man is renewed in the image of the one who created him. Again we read “put on the new self, created to be like God in true righteousness and holiness” (Eph 4:24). Now we must look at the details Paul includes in the new life. First he mentions knowledge, then true righteousness and holiness. So we infer that in the beginning, God’s image was evident by clear intellect, upright heart and integrity in every part. This has to be a brief summary, but the principle remains that what is of primary importance in restoration must also have been pre-eminent in creation. Paul says that as we gaze on the glory of Christ with unveiled face, we are transformed into his image (2 Cor. 3:18). Christ, of course, is the most perfect image of God and as we are renewed in him, we can bear the same image in knowledge, purity, righteousness and true holiness. The idea that the image is physical can be dismissed. The passage in 1 Corinthians 11:7, in which man alone is called the image and glory of God, obviously refers to civil order. The “image” includes anything which has relevance to spiritual and eternal life.2

Colossians 3:10 and Ephesians 4:24 give us clues as to what the image of God meant at creation, since in our regeneration and sanctification we are being restored in this image. Thus Calvin is working backwards to discover the biblical definition of the imago dei. The New Testament tells us that God is working in his people to restore them to the image of their Creator, so whatever is being restored is that which was lost when the image of God in humankind was distorted by sin. In Colossians and Ephesians, the image has to do with knowledge, righteousness, and holiness. There is no hint here that our conformity to God’s image has anything to do with our physical bodies. Christian theologian Louis Berkhof concurs: 

The condition to which [man] is restored in Christ is […] one of true knowledge, righteousness, and holiness. These elements constitute the original righteousness, which was lost by sin, but is regained in Christ. It may be called the moral image of God.3 

The fact that the imago dei is nonphysical does not mean that man must therefore be omnipotent, omniscient, or omnipresent. Scripture, not human reason or logic, must determine what the imago dei must mean—though there is room for discussion as to the full extent of its meaning and implications. There is much to suggest that the image of God is also substantially defined by the covenantal relation in which humans uniquely stand before God. Pastor and theologian Michael Horton notes that “‘image’ and ‘likeness’ in this ancient Near Eastern context especially have to do with the relationship of fathers and sons rather than forms and appearances.”4 In other words, our being in God’s image has less to do with how we replicate some godlike attribute than with our original, lost, and restored righteousness. 

Horton remarks that although humans do possess immaterial souls, this fact alone does not make humans in God’s image. Rather, it is “because they are created in true righteousness and holiness that they bear God’s image and likeness.”5 In fact, people were created with an innate sense not only of God’s existence (Rom. 1:21), but also of their duty to do God’s will (Rom. 2:14, 15). In other words, even though there may be differences of opinion about what characteristics of God our imago dei reflects, whether having to do with our faculties, such as rationality and abstract thought; our position of stewardship-dominion over the earth; or our ethical relation in covenant toward God and our neighbor image-bearers, the verses from Colossians, Ephesians and 2 Corinthians show that the restoration of the image of God in us, which was distorted by sin, is part of our salvation.

If James White’s theology were correct, though, there would be no need to restore this image since we already possess human bodies. The imago dei, therefore, must have to do with something intangible.

 

Sharing God’s shape?

Even if the image of God itself is not about our shape, does the Bible nonetheless imply that we share God’s shape? White points out several passages from Scripture that speak of God in bodily terms. But if these references mean that God is corporeal, how can one explain that God is invisible (Col. 1:15, 1 Ti m.1:17)? Physical persons are not invisible. 

White also talks at length about when God passed before Moses and showed him his back. If this account is to be taken literally to mean that God showed Moses a physical back, however, how do we explain John’s assertion that “no one has ever seen God” and “no one has seen the Father except the one who is from God [Jesus]; only he has seen the Father” (Jn. 1:18, 6:46, 1 Jn. 4:12)? These verses make it clear that whatever Moses was shown while he was in the cleft of the rock was a visible manifestation of God’s glory, but it was not a glimpse of the person of God himself. The word-picture of this being God’s “back” means that the vision, even such as it was, was veiled and limited.

Moses could not have seen the essence of God as he exists in himself. Remember, the apostle John says plainly, “No one has ever seen God” (1 Jn. 4:12). 

Keep in mind, too, that several Bible verses speak of God having wings. Are we to believe that Psalm 57:1, 63:7 and Ruth 2:12 teach that God literally has wings? No, which means that such descriptions must be teaching us something else.

White quotes the book of Daniel, chapter 7, which presents us with a scene in which “the Ancient of Days took his seat. His clothing was as white as snow; the hair of his head was white like wool.” The Ancient of Days is then approached by “one like a son of man.” White asserts that if we “deny their personality,” there “is not a distinct idea in these quotations from Daniel.” 

These portions of Daniel are apocalyptic in nature. Such literature is brimming with figurative speech. White should be more cautious. And of course, we do not deny the personhood of the Ancient of Days and the Son of Man; we only deny their physicality. We have no problem affirming that the persons of the triune God relate to one another and interact with one another. They do not have to be material persons to be persons. Moreover, in Revelation 1, John sees a similar vision:

And when I turned I saw seven golden lampstands, and among the lampstands was someone like a son of man, dressed in a robe reaching down to his feet and with a golden sash around his chest. The hair on his head was white like wool, as white as snow, and his eyes were like blazing fire. His feet were like bronze glowing in a furnace, and his voice was like the sound of rushing waters. In his right hand he held seven stars, and coming out of his mouth was a sharp, double-edged sword. His face was like the sun shining in all its brilliance.

I remember a sermon in which the pastor made a key point about these verses: they are telling us what Jesus is like, not how Jesus looks. It could be reasonable to believe that Jesus has white hair, but bronze feet? A sharp sword coming out of his mouth? 

A few chapters later, in Revelation 5, John has another vision of Jesus when he sees “a Lamb, looking as if it had been slain, standing at the center of the throne, encircled by the four living creatures and the elders. The Lamb had seven horns and seven eyes.” Here, Jesus is a young, seven-eyed, seven-horned sheep. On what basis would White say this vision is symbolic when he insists that other visions must be literal descriptions? Is a literal reading necessary for a proper understanding of what is happening in the heavenly throne room? A literal reading of this vision would in fact be a wild distortion of its true meaning. 

And how big is God? Presumably the Ancient of Days of Daniel 7 was the same height and build as the Jesus who walked the roads of Galilee (remember, God the Father and God the Son look identical in Adventist theology). Yet the Bible says that God “has measured the waters in the hollow of his hand” and “with the breadth of his hand marked off the heavens” (Is. 40:12). 

If all the passages which attribute physical characteristics to God were simply telling us what God looks like, they would all give the same description. Because there is such variance, though, we can assume that the descriptions are telling us about characteristics of God which are symbolized by those physical traits, but which are not physical traits. These passages indeed teach us things about God—about his position, power, tender mercy, holiness, justice, or plan—but they do not tell us what God looks like. God is invisible. God is Spirit.

Ironically, White admits that his material God is Spirit. How does he understand this apparent contradiction? 

First, White claims that angels, although spirits, are nonetheless material. “Angels are also spirits [Ps. 104: 4],” White says, “Yet those that visited Abram and Lot, lay down, ate, and took hold of Lot’s hand. They were spirit beings. So is God a Spirit being.” 

Thus White reasons that although God is called a Spirit in John 4:24, this designation does not mean he is not material. His reasoning, however, is flawed. Spirit beings can present themselves visibly to do God’s bidding, but the fact that they can assume a shape does not make them “material”. This “proof” White uses cannot explain the fact that ordinarily spirits are not visible or in any way detectable (Col. 1:16, Num. 22:31). 

Recall that in 2 Kings chapter 6, Elisha and the king of Israel are surrounded by the Aramean army. Elisha’s servant fearfully asks Elisha what they will do. Elisha tells him not to fear because those “who are with us are more than those who are with them.” Elisha prays that God will open his servant’s eyes, and the servant “looked and saw the hills full of horses and chariots of fire all around Elisha” which he was not able to see until that moment. 

The fact that angels can assume physical form does not mean they are essentially physical. On the contrary, the fact that angels and demons are ordinarily invisible means they must be immaterial, because material beings cannot be totally invisible. 

 

What about Jesus?

White’s next point is that God must have a physical form because Jesus is his express image. White quotes Hebrews 1:3, which says that Jesus is the “express image of his [God’s] person” (KJV). We agree that Jesus is the perfect image of God, but is this form of “exact representation” (NIV) or “exact imprint” (ESV) of God’s nature no more than the same kind of likeness that one identical twin has of another?

According to Ellen G. White, Jesus is the express image of his Father’s person at least in part because he looks just like him. What implication does this theology have for our hope to be “conformed to the image” of God’s Son (Rom. 8:29)? Does conformity to Christ’s image mean that we begin to love like Jesus loves, to display obedience and service as Jesus did, to develop the fruit of the Spirit, to develop the qualities of 1 Peter 1:5–7? Or rather, does this mean we will all (including women) physically look like Jesus eventually? That’s absurd, of course. But if “image” in Romans 8:29 does not mean physical likeness, then it does not mean it in Genesis 1:26 or anywhere else either.

Rather, Jesus is the brightness of God’s glory and express image of God’s person, because Jesus is the clearest picture of God’s character the world has ever known. Jesus is the final revelation from God about himself. Hebrews gives us this definition of “express image” in the same passage, when it says that “in the past God spoke to our ancestors through the prophets at many times and in various ways, but in these last days he has spoken to us by his Son.” 

The Gospel of John makes a similar affirmation when introducing Jesus. It says, “No one has ever seen God, but the one and only Son, who is himself God and is in closest relationship with the Father, has made him known” (1:18). That phrase “has made him known” means he expounds, explains, or exegetes God to us. He, who is himself God, comes to earth as a man to demonstrate for us at point blank range what God is really like, and that is why Jesus is the express image and exact representation of God.

James White later tries to tackle the objection that God is omnipresent (for how can a material God be everywhere at the same time?). He doesn’t outright deny the doctrine of omnipresence but redefines it so that it no longer means that God is really all places simultaneously. He offers two answers. First, that God is everywhere “by virtue of his omniscience,” and second, that God is everywhere “by virtue of his Spirit.”6 

Psalm 139, a common proof text for divine omnipresence, does speak of God’s omniscience in conjunction with God’s omnipresence, but these two attributes are not the same thing. Notice the verses of the second stanza. David asks, “Where can I go from your presence?” (same in KJV). “If I go up to the heavens, you are there. If I make my bed in the depths, you are there.” etc. These seem to be speaking of God’s immanent presence rather than simply a knowledge of what is going on in those places. Furthermore, Solomon observed, “But will God really dwell on earth? The heavens, even the highest heaven, cannot contain you. How much less this temple I have built!” (1Ki. 8:27, cf. 2 Chr. 2:6 and 6:18). If God is a physical person, Solomon’s declaration seems like an exaggeration, to say the least. God himself says, “Do I not fill heaven and earth?” (Jer. 23:24).

But, White says, “God is everywhere by virtue of his Spirit, which is his representative, and is manifested wherever he pleases, as will be seen by the very words the objector claims.”7 And he quotes Psalm 139:7, “Whither shall I go from thy Spirit?” Importantly, however, White did not believe in the Trinity, and for him, God’s Spirit was an impersonal force or presence that came from God to help humans. Thus, speaking of God’s Spirit as being many places at once was not a source of confusion for him. But while solving the dilemma, it does not actually deal with the psalmist’s language when he asks “Where can I go from your presence?” because in White’s theology, in which God’s Spirit is not God, being in the presence of God’s spirit is not the same as being in God’s presence at all. 

Still, White’s next argument against omnipresence is more challenging. “God is in heaven” he asserts, “This we are taught in the Lord’s Prayer.” If this definition is true, however, White objects that “if God is as much in every place as he is in any one place, then heaven is also as much in every place as it is in any one place, and the idea of going to heaven is all a mistake. Agreed, and in fact I would also say that an acceptable definition of heaven is “where God dwells.” We are all in heaven; and the Lord’s prayer, according to this foggy theology simply means, Our Father which art everywhere, hallowed be thy name. Thy kingdom come, thy will be done, on earth, as it is everywhere.”8 

White continues by showing that heaven is not everywhere, but somewhere in particular, since Enoch and Elijah were taken up to heaven, Jesus was received up into heaven, and Jesus is seated at the right hand of the Majesty on high. To overcome this argument, we who believe that God is omnipresent must show that God can be in particular places in some special or more intense way, while also being all places in some general way.

In light of all the verses cited above, we are forced to concede God’s personal omnipresence. That is, He is not only “present in creation per potentiam (with His power)”, as Berkhof says, but is present “with His very being and nature.”9 Yet the Bible also reveals that God “is not equally present and present in the same sense in all His creatures. He does not dwell on earth as He does in heaven, in animals as He does in man, […] nor in the church as He does in Christ.”10 Jeremiah 23 teaches that God has always been both “nearby” and “far away.” And yet, in the incarnation, the Word “made his dwelling among us” in a new way. Jesus promised his disciples that “where two or three gather in my name, there am I with them,” but also promised that “I am with you always” (Mt. 28:20). 

Then again, He previously told his disciples “you will not always have me” (Mt. 26:11) because, as He later explained, “I came from the Father and entered the world; now I am leaving the world and going back to the Father” (Jn. 16:28). Psalm 139, as we saw before, says “if I make my bed in hell, behold, thou art there” (KJV). Yet Paul warns us that the wicked “will be punished with everlasting destruction and shut out from the presence of the Lord” (2 Th. 1:9). Indeed, in the very chapter in Jeremiah where God asserts his own omnipresence, God later tells the false prophets, “I will surely […] cast you out of my presence.” 

What is going on here? The Bible teaches, for example, that God is one God, and yet identifies three distinguishable persons as that God, and so we must hold those truths in tandem in the doctrine of the Trinity. Similarly, if the Bible teaches that God is in all places, not in a diffused manner, but so that his whole being is all places at all times, and yet teaches that God’s presence is specially manifested and concentrated in some sense in particular places and in a variety of ways, we must accept that God, as a Spirit, is able to interrelate with his creation in such a manner. This is a mystery, surely, but it’s one supported by Scripture. The idea that God is bodily and spatially limited is absolutely impossible to match with the biblical data. Even though a “physical” God might seem more comprehensible than an immaterial one, such an idea has many more exegetical problems than does the orthodox doctrine of omnipresence—a doctrine which demands a God of immaterial essence.

 

Philosophical problems

Finally, I will comment on White’s more general or philosophical problems with immateriality. I begin by observing the irony that while he accuses the “sectarians” (his word for evangelicals) of having so much in common with atheists, White shares with atheists the belief that material things are the only things that exist or can exist. He cannot see how an immaterial spirit could in any way interact with or influence a material being in a material world. 

I admit that it is hard to know just how an immaterial being would “make contact” in such way as to have affect upon material things—that is, what the “touch point” would be. This lack of understanding, however, is only because we don’t know how immaterial beings work. They are by definition outside the realm of observation. It should be enough to know that if divine revelation assumes the existence of spirits, such as angels and of God himself, then there is a way for such beings to occasionally make themselves known to the physical senses. Most of the time such beings are indeed undetectable (Num. 22:31, 2 Ki. 6:17). 

Ephesians 6:12 says that “our struggle is not against flesh and blood, but against the rulers, against the authorities, against the powers of this dark world and against the spiritual forces of evil in the heavenly realms.” Here Paul speaks of rulers and authorities (personal beings) that are not material, but which nevertheless interact with us. Of course, once one accepts that God is immaterial Spirit, as the Bible teaches, and that God created the material world intending to have fellowship with material people, the how of it becomes merely academic. Much more unworkable is the idea that God is eternally physical and resembles a human male. Also difficult (and I would say insurmountably problematic) is the idea that humans can think, feel, and exercise freewill without any immaterial aspect that is distinct from the brain.

Nevertheless, the fact that Christianity believes in an immaterial dimension does not mean Christians seek to escape to it. White is mistaken when he states of evangelicals that immateriality is their “anticipated heaven, [their] immortal self—[their] all.” 

Christians have always believed in a physical eternal state on a new earth, where “God’s dwelling place is now among the people, and he will dwell with them” (Rev. 21:3). While we as Christians do believe that we will be with God after death in a disembodied state until the resurrection (Rev. 6:9), we also believe that state is temporary, and in that state we are not quite whole. Our expectation is to be reunited to our bodies and to live in a heaven that has been brought down to earth. Our eternity will be lived in our new bodies on a new earth. We claim we will have bodies forever! 

The difference between the Christian view and White’s view is that White claims we are our bodies. In fact, the human soul can and does live apart from the body (2 Cor. 5:9) and is the seat of human consciousness. We were not meant, however, to be spirits only nor bodies only, but spirit and body in vital union (Gen. 2:7), both in this life and in glory. Immateriality is neither our anticipated heaven nor our immortal selves.

White says that if God is without body or parts it is like having no God at all—it is “the negative of all things which exist—and both [immateriality and atheism] are equally powerless and unknown.”11 That assertion begs the question. That assertion only makes sense for someone who believes that only material beings exist. Someone who believes in immaterial beings is obviously not claiming the negative of God’s existence by claiming God is immaterial. Clearly, White equates existence itself with material existence. He defines immateriality as nonentity. He does this because he presupposes that mind cannot exist as spirit. 

There is no rational basis for defining immateriality as nonentity. White’s proof that there is no such thing as an immaterial substance is that he cannot conceive of one! Incidentally, in assuming mind cannot exist as spirit and that there can be no way of proving the existence of anything immaterial, White is just like the atheist.

White says, “The atheist has no after life, or conscious existence beyond the grave. The sectarian has one, but it is immaterial, like his God; and without body or parts. Here again both are negative, and both arrive at the same point. Their faith and hope amount to the same; only it is expressed by different terms.”12 

The atheist denies any afterlife or conscious existence beyond the grave, as White says. Evangelicals believe in an afterlife which is temporarily immaterial, but as immaterial spirit beings can have conscious existence from an evangelical perspective, that presents no problem. There is a qualitative difference between what the atheist says (you cease to be) and what we say (you continue on). The atheistic and evangelical conceptions of the afterlife in no way whatsoever “arrive at the same point.” Indeed, I should point out that in Adventist theology, until the resurrection occurs, the state of the dead is ABSOLUTELY IDENTICAL to that of the atheist!

Both the Adventist and the atheist, in fact, need to explain why there is any difference at all between what is alive and what is dead. As I said, White believes that mind cannot exist as spirit. I, on the other hand, believe that mind can only exist as spirit. Why? Because awareness, perception, and the experiencing of sensations are not properties of matter. No arrangement of inanimate matter can cause it to “wake up” and begin to think and feel. This is impossible in principle. 

Our consciousness must be a property of soul, which in this life is connected to our bodies as its vehicle of expression. In this life, we do need eyes and brains to see, but to know that we are seeing something, we need a soul. This must be true of all physical creatures that have awareness or feel pain or pleasure (Eccl. 3:21). In the end, Seventh-day Adventism’s conception of a corporeal God fails to explain the nature and actions of God described in the Bible, as well as what it means to be made in God’s image. White argues that we cannot conceive of an immaterial being. So what? God is far beyond our comprehension. †

 

Endnotes

  1. White, James. Personality of God. Seventh-day Adventist Pub. Association, 1862. Web. 11 Oct 2018. <www.adventpioneerbooks.com/Text/pioneer/JWHITE/PERSONAL.pdf>
  2. Calvin, John. Institutes of Christian Religion. ed. Tony Lane and Hilary Osborne. Abr. Ed. Grand Rapids, Baker Book House, 1987. Print.
  3. Berkhof, Louis. Systematic Theology. Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1953. Print.
  4. Horton, Michael. The Christian Faith. Grand Rapids, Zondervan, 2011. Print. p. 388.
  5. Ibid., 395.
  6. White, James. Personality of God. Seventh-day Adventist Pub. Association, 1862. Web. 11 Oct 2018. <www.adventpioneerbooks.com/Text/pioneer/JWHITE/PERSONAL.pdf>
  7. Ibid.
  8. Ibid.
  9. Berkhof, Louis. Systematic Theology. Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1953. Print. pp. 60, 61.
  10. Ibid.
  11. White, James. Personality of God. Seventh-day Adventist Pub. Association, 1862. Web. 11 Oct 2018. <www.adventpioneerbooks.com/Text/pioneer/JWHITE/PERSONAL.pdf>
  12. Ibid.
Jordan Quinley
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2 comments

  1. Many thanks for this insightful and well-researched article. I would like to add one simple, yet contextually-based consideration as to the meaning of “image of God” in Genesis 1:26, 27 and the Edenic narrative. The article correctly points out that such an image, possessed equally by the male and female of our species, obviously goes beyond mere physicality, unless someone wants to suggest the Deity is some kind of hermaphroditic being, an extremely dubious concept. Do we see humans somehow manifesting one particular divine trait in the first couple of chapters in the Bible? We could say that, obviously, humans reason, and that’s, undoubtedly, one of the traits we all assume God has in a superlative way. However, it seems to me there is no clear-cut endorsement in the first few chapters of Genesis of particular traits that humans share with the God that created them, except for one, and I find this highly significant, considering John 1:1. Genesis 1 repeatedly states that God named several of the things he created, bringing them into existence (ver. 5, 8, 10). Curiously enough, as far as we know, God did not name any of the animals he created. The name they were to receive was left up to Adam (Gen. 2:19, 20). Adam also gave a name to his mate (Gen. 2:23). Interestingly, the text insists that “whatever the man called each living creature, that was its name” (ver. 19), much like the names given by God to day and night, sky, land and sea went uncontested. If this interpretation, exclusively circumscribed to the first couple of chapters of the Bible, is correct, it is one more nail in the coffin of James White’s inept theology.

  2. I, too, enjoyed your article exploring the aberrant theology of Adventism with respect to the nature of God. Adam had 930 years to ponder the mystery of his createdness. He was unlike any of his descendants, being fashioned directly from the earth as opposed to natural childbirth. Using the same terminology involved in his creation—in the image and likeness of God—Adam so described the birth of his third son, Seth (Gen 5:1-3). While the repeated phrase can be construed as the physical likeness between Adam and Seth, it is doubtful that it can be interpreted as such in the relationship between God and Adam.
    Adam was not “fathered” in the same manner as Cain and Abel and Seth. They required a man and a woman, but Adam came into existence through the creative act of Elohim. Only God creates (Heb. bara); man begets (Heb. yalad). And if God had to create man, then He did not have the capacity to beget man, hence God is not a physical being. Adam would come to know that he depended on the material world to live. If God were material, then He too would be dependent on material things. However, God existed before anything material came into being (Gen 1:1). Again, God transcends what he has created.
    This is to say what being made in the image and likeness of God is not. However, being made in God’s image conferred a value on human beings that was not shared by anything else in creation (Gen 9:6). Adam did not have the authority to bestow this value on any of his children. That value is intrinsic, emanating from the breath of life that made Adam a living being in the first place.

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